Discourses on 'climate migration' have played an instrumental role in initiating negotiations on 'loss and damage' under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Yet, 'climate migration' has rather confusedly been framed, alternatively, as a tool for reducing loss and damage (hence essentially a form of adaptation) or as a source of loss and damage, either for the migrants or for other concerned communities. Meanwhile, proposed approaches to address migration as a form of loss and damage have extended beyond compensation, which remain controversial among industrial nations. In the highly politicized field of migration governance, however, this article submits that policy support and guidance in addressing loss and damage could prompt dangerous forms of political interference, such as the imposition of Western states' objective of containing migrants in the Global South. It is thus suggested that top-down migration policies may not genuinely help vulnerable nations face loss and damage.
INTRODUCTION
Empirical as well as theoretical migration studies published over the last two decades have established that environmental change has an impact on human mobility, in particular within its multiple effects, identifying the adverse consequences of climate change inevitably involves value judgments. Migration has sometimes been conceived as a normal or opportune social process of adaptation; other times, it was depicted as a harmful phenomenon.
In this article, I wish to question the desirability of including considerations for human mobility within the UNFCCC workstream on loss and damage and future actions to which it may lead.
More specifically, I show some grounds for scepticism regarding the ability of global institutions to 'guide' domestic migration policies to the benefit of the populations of the most vulnerable developing states. On the one hand, migration comprises multifaceted and complex human practices: national migration policies need to be carefully devised as part of a holistic approach of development, and top-down one-size-fits-all 'solutions' could be counterproductive. On the other hand, it cannot be ignored that Western states have their own political agendas, including a strongly perceived interest in containing migrants in the South, 10 and that international guidance in addressing loss and damage could become a Trojan horse for a Western influence in the migration policies of the developing states most vulnerable to climate change impacts. 9 Lawyers have developed relevant reflections on the attribution of injuries, in particular in the common law of tort, the civil law of extra-contractual responsibility, and the international law of state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. 10 See, for a dated but strong theoretical discussion: B.S. Chimni, 'The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from the South' (1998) 11(4) Journal of Refugee Studies, pp. 350-74. 7 proposing an alternative focus on risk management, in particular through risk-sharing mechanisms and disaster risk reduction strategies.
After three years and little progress, the 2010 Cancún Agreements (COP 16) established a 'work programme,' assigned to the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), in order, again, 'to consider, including through workshops and expert meetings, as appropriate, approaches to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.' 28 The Cancún Agreements also clarified that this work programme would cover 'the impacts related to extreme weather events and slow onset events,' 29 such as 'sea level rise, increasing temperatures, ocean acidification, glacial retreat and related impacts, salinization, land and forest degradation, loss of biodiversity and desertification.' 30 While the Cancún Agreements emphasized the relevance of migration for adaptation, as noted above, 31 no connection was made between migration and loss and damage.
The 2011 Durban conference (COP 17) defined three thematic areas for the work programme on loss and damage: assessing the risk of loss and damage, developing approaches to address loss and damage, and defining the role of UNFCCC negotiations. 32 Building up on the last one, the 2012 Doha conference (COP 18) determined the role of the Convention in relation to loss and damage as (a) 'enhancing knowledge and understanding,' (b) 'strengthening dialogue, coordination, coherence and synergies,' and (c) 'enhancing action and support, including finance, technology and capacity-building.' 33 While developed states continued to oppose any reference to 'redress' or 'compensation,' they progressively agreed to redirect discussions on possible forms of technical or financial 'support' to the most vulnerable developing countries. These framings put emphasis on particular aspects of loss and damage in relation to particular migration scenarios. For instance, the framing of migration as a loss and damage for the migrants themselves applies most convincingly to forced migration, whereas voluntary migration is more often depicted as a way of reducing loss and damage. Likewise, the expenses met by host communities through programs to assist and protect incoming migrants can alternatively be framed as a way of addressing (mostly non-economic) loss and damage suffered by the migrants themselves, or as (mostly economic) loss and damage -mainly expenses -suffered by the host community as a consequence of migration. But even if these framings are not mutually exclusive in principle, they tend to suggest distinct responses to the growing momentum for actions on 'climate migration.'
Migration as a Way of Reducing Loss and Damage
First of all, human mobility can be considered as a way of reducing loss and damage associated seek either to protect migrants or to 'manage' migration through measures including for instance economic incentives, border surveillance, and forced resettlement.
It is therefore unsurprising that mobility has been reported as a coping or adaptation mechanism in the context of climate change, encouraging debates on appropriate policy responses. Very diverse dynamics have been discussed within the UNFCCC workstream on loss and damage.
For instance, a submission by Gambia (on behalf of the Least Developed Countries Group)
highlighted that some farmer households were increasingly turning to seasonal urban or crossborder mobility to cope with a drought affecting millet production. 
Migration as a Source of Loss and Damage for the Migrants
Second of all, human mobility can also be considered as a source of loss and damage suffered by the migrants themselves. Loss and damage can be suffered by migrants through any forms 
Migration as a Source of Loss and Damage for other Concerned Communities
Third of all, human mobility can sometimes be considered as inflicting loss and damage to other stakeholders, in particular host states or communities. It must be kept in mind that certainly most migration scenarios unfold to the net benefit of host communities, given the contribution of migrants to the economic, social and cultural life of these communities. 73 Yet, the sudden arrival of large numbers of individuals may induce loss and damage that are suffered 69 Ibid. Despite some amount of international humanitarian assistance, most of the economic and noneconomic burden of hosting large populations of migrants -refugees, in particular -has generally been sustained by host communities themselves.
International practice has sometimes recognized loss and damage suffered by host communities. For instance, the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees recognizes that 'the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries.' 75 States have made efforts -although by and large unsuccessful -to define ways to share the 'burden' or 'responsibility' for the protection of refugees. 76 Instead, large migrations have sometimes been constructed as a threat for the security of the states of destination. Thus, since the end of the Cold War, the UN Security Council has repeatedly considered that a 'massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers' could constitute a threat to international peace and security. 77 In the same perspective, NATO's Secretary General tried to justify armed intervention in Kosovo by presenting refugees from Kosovo as a threat to regional stability. 78 More fundamentally, Western states' prevailing objective of containing migrants in the developing world, in particular through a non-entrée strategy, supported by border surveillance 74 See for instance M. Czaika, 'A Refugee Burden Index: Methodology and its Application' derives from the prevalent (although highly questionable) framing of migration as a burden, rather than an opportunity, for the host states. Approaches are needed to protect populations from the adverse impacts of climate change, not to prevent them from seeking shelter elsewhere.
APPROACHES TO ADDRESS MIGRATION ASPECTS OF LOSS AND DAMAGE
Framing human mobility in relation to loss and damage associated with climate change impacts has important implications. The political utilization of fears of 'climate refugees,' perceived as a source of harms for host communities, has serious drawbacks. A conscious balance of the three framings detailed above -as a way to reduce loss and damage and a possible source of loss and damage for either migrants themselves and for the surrounding communities -could help in devising more adequate approaches to address loss and damage. Building on these bases, this section explores possible approaches to address migration aspects of loss and damage beyond the current mandate of the WIM (research and advocacy), either through topdown governance responses, or through diverse forms of remedial obligations.
Governing 'Climate Migration'
Diverse proposals for norms, policies or programs have been submitted to the UNFCCC workstream on loss and damage in relation to human mobility. A general distinction can be drawn between proposals that put emphasis on 'managing' migration, and those which put a clearer stress on the need to protect migrants. The proposals that aim at 'managing' migration are generally fuelled by the perception of migration as a potential source of loss and damage for the migrants themselves or for other stakeholders. For instance, 'provisions for establishing a climate change displacement coordination facility' were proposed for inclusion, among other 'institutional arrangements' to address loss and damage, within some negotiation instruments migrants who encounter similar needs for protection. 104 The cause of migration -i.e. the loss and damage that migration attempts to avoid -is distinct from the cause of the vulnerability of migrants -i.e. the loss and damage suffered as a result of migration. The perception of the impacts of climate change on migration could serve as a wake-up call for a better protection of migrants across the world, and one may hope that it will spur some reforms towards stronger protection policies, but the climate regime is probably not the right forum to address the general protection needs of migrants.
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Other proposals for a better management of migration or a better protection of migrants as part of approaches to address loss and damage raise comparable issues. Here again, defining the scope of 'climate migration' remains difficult because of the indirect causality at play.
Therefore, it is not clear how a 'climate change displacement coordination facility' could adopt a workable definition of its scope of action. On the other hand, putting greater emphasis on some scenarios of 'climate migration' rather than on other migration scenarios featuring analogous human vulnerabilities could result in imposing arbitrary priorities on national authorities and other stakeholders in the allocation of scarce protection resources among different populations. 106 For these reasons, the IFCR's preference for mainstreaming considerations for climate change impacts within a broader, holistic approach of humanitarian and development actions is certainly commendable. 107 The occurrence of climate change impacts affecting migration highlights and exacerbates the need for general reforms in international migration governance -both with regard to the management of migration and the protection of migrants, in order to promote migration as a mutually-beneficial process -but it does not justify particular policies that would isolate and try to address 'climate migration' as if it was a distinct phenomenon. The provision of visas, status, or territory to 'climate migrants' has arguably something in common with restitution, as it aims essentially at the restoration of decent conditions of life for individuals affected by climate change impacts. 133 However, such forms of assistance involve a much greater degree of political interference than restitution (defined as efforts to re-establish the status quo ante) 134 or through compensation (the transfer of fungible value, usually money, of which the injured state can dispose as is seen fit). 135 The provision of in-kind assistance, support, or a fortiori guidance would certainly affect the ability of the populations and states in question to determine, through their regular political processes, the course of action that they wish to take. Replicating the experience of colonialism, this hindrance to the development of functional political institutions would be used as an excuse for further foreign political interference. Such interference is particularly problematic when it concerns the highly politicized field of migration governance, which involves complex trade-offs between collective identity and individual opportunities, and more generally very 'intimate' decisions about individual and collective projects. Within the margin allowed by international human rights standards, domestic and local responses to loss and damage -including, decisions as to whether and how to migrate -need to be decided by the populations concerned, not by international organizations or foreign donors. 131 Thus, the United States accepted to resettle numerous Vietnamese refugees following the In these circumstances, in-kind assistance provided by international or foreign institutions in response to the influence of climate change on migration would likely betray the interests of their recipients. Top-down normative responses to 'climate migration,' in particular, risk to ignore the great diversity of climate change-related migration scenarios and the need for responses that take local circumstances into account. 136 More specifically, advocacy for the protection of so-called 'climate migrants' could push for an arbitrary allocation of scare protection resources (especially within states whose protection resources will increasingly be strained by the adverse impacts of climate change), thus doing a disservice to the populations 'trapped in place' (who lack the resources necessary to migrate) 137 and to those, not necessarily any less vulnerable, who migrate for reasons unrelated to climate change impacts. Above all, allowing international or foreign institutions to coordinate, support or guide migration policies in developing states would create one more opportunity for Western states to impose their own agendas, in a field of governance intrinsically connected to the determination of national development priorities. The strongest emphasis would likely not be placed on the promotion of mutually-beneficial migration or on the protection of the rights of migrants, but rather on the protection of the most powerful states against the perceived threats of massive 'flows' of 'climate refugees.' Alternative approaches to address loss and damage, in particular as a stateto-state process of compensation to facilitate capacity building, were suggested elsewhere. 
CONCLUSION
Human mobility is often a fruitful social process through which individuals, households and communities adapt to changes of circumstances. It can also be a source of harm, either for the migrants themselves -most obviously in the case of resettled or evacuated populations -or sometimes for other stakeholders, in particular the host communities in cases of mass arrivals.
collective identities are constructed. Governments are obligated, under international human rights law, to protect populations within their jurisdiction and to cooperate in the protection of populations abroad -including migrants, who are often more vulnerable than other populations. The UNFCCC workstream on loss and damage is likely to unveil many shortcomings in global migration governance, and it could play an important role in raising awareness on the need for more genuine international cooperation for the protection of the human rights of all.
Yet, this article questioned the opportunity of allowing the UNFCCC workstream on loss and damage to define responses to climate change impacts, in particular with regard to human mobility. Migration decisions taken at all levels (e.g. individuals, households, communities or states) relate to highly 'intimate' preferences. Such choices as between adaptation in situ and migration are closely connected to development strategies, the determination of which has long been advocated as the fundamental preserve of national governments. 139 Those developing states most vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change need financial support and capacity building at least as urgently as policy support: these states ought to be able (like any other state) to define, through their own political processes informed by an open transnational debate, the best way to pursue their own interests, as they view them. Approaches to address loss and damage, which should convey financial support and promote capacity building, should as far as possible refrain from interfering with the domestic political processes of these states, especially in the very politically-sensitive area of migration governance.
